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Abstract
The goal of this paper is to study a stochastic game connected to a
system of forward backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs)
involving delay and noisy memory. We derive sufficient and necessary
maximum principles for a set of controls for the players to be a Nash
equilibrium in the game. Furthermore, we study a corresponding FB-
SDE involving Malliavin derivatives. This kind of equation has not been
studied before. The maximum principles give conditions for determining
the Nash equilibrium of the game. We use this to derive a closed form
Nash equilibrium for an economic model where the players maximize their
consumption with respect to recursive utility.
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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to study a stochastic game between two players. The
game is based on a forward stochastic differential equation (SDE) for the process
X . In applications to economy, this process can be thought of as the market
situation, e.g. the financial market, the housing market or the oil market. This
SDE includes two kinds of memory of the past; regular memory and noisy
memory. Regular memory (also called delay, see f. ex. the survey paper by
Ivanov et al. [7]) means that the SDE can depend on previous values of the
process X . That is, for some given δ > 0, X(t) depends on X(t− δ). For more
on stochastic delay differential equations and optimal control with delay, see
Øksendal et al [18] and Agram and Øksendal [3]. In constrast, noisy memory
means that the SDE may involve an Itô integral over previous values of the
process, so for δ > 0, X(t) depends on
∫ t
t−δ
X(s)dB(s) where {B(s)}s∈[0,T ] is a
Brownian motion. For more on noisy memory, see Dahl et al. [6].
Connected to this SDE are two backward stochastic differential equations
(BSDEs). These BSDEs are connected to the SDE in the sense that they depend
on {X(t)}t∈[0,T ], as well as the delay and noisy memory of this process. Hence,
this forms an FBSDE system. Each of these BSDEs corresponds to one of the
players in the stochastic game; corresponding to player i = 1, 2 is a BSDE in
the process {Wi(t)}t∈[0,T ]. The length of memory can be different for the two
players, so for i = 1, 2, player i has memory span δi. The players may also
have different levels of information, which is included in the model by having
(potentially) different filtrations {E
(i)
t }t∈[0,T ], i = 1, 2.
Each of the players aim to find an optimal control ui which maximizes their
personal performance (objective) function, Ji. Seminal work in stochastic op-
timal control has been done by Krylov and his students, see e.g. Krylov [8]
and [9]. The performance function of each of the agents will be defined in such
a way that it depends on the player’s profit rate, the market process X and
the process Wi coming from the player’s BSDE (more on this in Section 2,
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equation (3)). This kind of problem, where both players maximize their perfor-
mance which depends on an FBSDE, is called an FBSDE stochastic game, and
has been studied by e.g. Øksendal and Sulem [14]. However, they do not include
memory in their model. We study conditions for a pair of controls (u1, u2) to
be a Nash equilibrium for such a stochastic game. That is, we would like to de-
termine controls such that the players cannot benefit by changing their actions.
In order to do so, we derive sufficient and necessary maximum principles giving
conditions for a control to be Nash optimal. This is done in Sections 3 and
4. Maximum principles for forward backward stochastic differential equations
(FBSDEs) have been studied by Wang and Wu [23] as well as Øksendal and
Sulem [14], but these papers do not consider a stochastic game.
In connection with these maximum principles, there are adjoint equations
(see e.g. Øksendal [12] for an introduction to sotchastic maximum principles
and adjoint equations, or Øksendal and Sulem [15] for maximum principles and
adjoint equations where delay is involved). In our case, these adjoint equations
are a system of coupled forward backward stochastic differential equations in-
volving Malliavin derivatives (see Di Nunno et al. [5] for more on Malliavin
derivatives). To the best of our knowledge, such equations have not been stud-
ied before. In Section 5 we study a slightly simplified version of these adjoint
FBSDEs, and establish a connection between these equations and a system of
FBSDEs without Malliavin derivatives. Finally, in Section 6, we apply our re-
sults to a specific example in order to determine the optimal consumption with
respect to recursive utility.
2 The problem
Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space, and let B(t), t ∈ [0, T ] be a Brownian
motion in this space. Also, let N˜(t, ·) be an independent compensated Poisson
random measure. Let (Ft)t∈[0,T ] be the P -augmented filtration generated by
B(t) and N˜(t, ·).
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We will consider a game between two players: player 1 and player 2. Let ui(t)
be the control process chosen by player i = 1, 2, and denote u(t) = (u1(t), u2(t)).
Let Ai, i = 1, 2, denote the set of admissible controls for player i and A =
A1 ×A2.
We consider a controlled forward stochastic differential equation for a process
X(t) = Xu(t, ω), ω ∈ Ω, t ∈ [0, T ] determining the market situation (in the
following, we omit the ω for notational ease unless it is important to highlight
its dependence):
dX(t) = b(t,X(t),Y (t),Λ(t),u(t), ω)dt
+σ(t,X(t),Y (t),Λ(t),u(t), ω)dB(t)
+
∫
R
γ(t−, X(t−),Y (t−),Λ(t−),u(t−), ζ, ω)N˜(dt, dζ)
X(0) = x
(1)
where Y (t) = (Y1(t), Y2(t)), Λ(t) = (Λ1(t),Λ2(t)), and Yi(t) := X(t − δi),
Λi(t) :=
∫ t
t−δi
X(s)dB(s), and δi ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2. The superscript t
− means
that we are taking the left limit of the process is question (that is, the value
before a potential jump at time t), see Øksendal and Sulem [13] for more on
this.
Here, the delay processes Yi, and the noisy memory processes Λi correspond
to player i = 1, 2 respectively. Hence, the two players may have memories for
different time intervals, depending on the values of δi. Also,
b : [0, T ]× R× R2 × R2 ×A× Ω→ R,
σ : [0, T ]× R× R2 × R2 ×A× Ω→ R,
γ : [0, T ]× R× R2 × R2 ×A× Ω→ R
are predictable functions such that for each u ∈ A the SDE (1) has a unique
solution.
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Remark 2.1 Existence and uniqueness of solution for the SDE (1) is guaran-
teed under certain, fairly unrestrictive, assumptions on the coefficient functions,
see Dahl et al. [6], Assumption 1, for conditions ensuring existence and unique-
ness of solution to (1). This can be seen by viewing equation (1) as a stochastic
functional differential equation.
In addition to this, the players (potentially) have different levels of informa-
tion, represented by different subfiltrations E
(i)
t ⊆ Ft for all t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2.
For i = 1, 2, let gi(·, x, y,Λ, wi, zi, ki(·), u, ω) be a given predictable process,
and let hi(x, ω) be an FT -measurable function. Associated to the FSDE (1),
we have a pair of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) in the
unknown stochastic processes (Wi, Zi,Ki), i = 1, 2:
dWi(t) = −gi(t,X(t),Y (t),Λ(t),Wi(t), Zi(t),Ki(t, ·),u(t), ω)dt
+Zi(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
Ki(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ)
Wi(T ) = hi(X(T ), ω).
(2)
Note that these BSDEs are coupled to the SDE (1) due to the dependency
on X . Also, the BSDEs depend on the memory of the market process X , due to
the dependency on the processes Y and Λ. However, equation (2) is a standard
BSDE, hence the conditions for existence and uniqueness of solution is well
known, see e.g. Pardoux and Peng [20].
For i = 1, 2, let fi : [0, T ]×R×R×R×A×Ω→ R, ϕi : R→ R, ψi : R→ R
be functions representing a profit rate, bequest function and risk evaluation.
Then, the performance function of each player i = 1, 2 is defined by:
Ji(u) = E[
∫ T
0
fi(t,X
u(t), Y ui (t),Λ
u
i (t), ui(t))dt+ϕi(X
u(T ))+ψi(W
u
i (0))] (3)
where we must assume all conditions necessary for the integrals and the expec-
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tation to exist.
Also, note that the performance Ji of player i is a function of the control
u(t) = (u1(t), u2(t)), which is determined by both players. Therefore, this
problem setting specifies a stochastic game.
A pair of controls (uˆ1, uˆ2) is called a Nash equilibrium for this stochastic
game if the following holds:
J1(u1, uˆ2) ≤ J1(uˆ1, uˆ2) for all u1 ∈ A1
J2(uˆ1, u2) ≤ J2(uˆ1, uˆ2) for all u2 ∈ A2.
(4)
In words, this means that in the Nash equilibrium, neither player would like
to change their control.
Assume there exists a Nash equilibrium for this forward-backward stochas-
tic differential (FBSDE) game with delay and noisy memory. We would like to
find this Nash equilibrium, and we will do so by proving sufficient and neces-
sary maximum principles for this problem. Therefore, we define a Hamiltonian
function for each player i = 1, 2 as follows:
Hi(t, x,y,Λ, wi, zi, ki, u1, u2, λi, pi, qi, ri) = fi(t, x, yi,Λi, ui)
+λigi(t, x,y,Λ, wi, zi, ki, u1, u2) + pib(t, x,y,Λ, u1, u2)
+qiσ(t, x,y,Λ, u1, u2) +
∫
R
ri(ζ)γ(t, x,y,Λ, u1, u2, ζ)ν(dζ).
(5)
Assume Hi is C
1 in x, y1, y2,Λ1,Λ2, wi, zi, ki, u1, u2 for i = 1, 2. In the
following, for ease of notation, we will use the abbreviation
Hi(t) = Hi(t, x,y,Λ, wi, zi, ki, u1, u2, λi, pi, qi, ri)
For i = 1, 2, we define a system of FBSDEs associated to these Hamiltonians
in the unknown adjoint processes (λi, pi, qi, ri):
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FSDE in λi (which depends on pi, qi, ri):
dλi(t) =
∂Hi
∂wi
(t)dt+ ∂Hi
∂zi
(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
∇ki(Hi(t, ζ))N˜ (dt, dζ)
λi(0) = ψ
′
i(Wi(0)).
(6)
where ∇ki(Hi(t, ζ)) is the Fréchet derivative of Hi at ki, see the appendix in
Øksendal and Sulem [14] for a closer explanation of this gradient.
We also define a BSDE in pi, qi, ri, which depends on λi:
dpi(t) = E[µi(t)|Ft]dt+ qi(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
ri(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ)
pi(T ) = ϕ
′
i(X(T )) + h
′
i(X(T ))λi(T )
(7)
where
µi(t) = −
∂Hi
∂x
(t)−
∂Hi
∂yi
(t+ δi)1[0,T−δi](t)−
∫ t+δi
t
Dt[
∂Hi
∂Λi
(s)1[0,T ](s)ds]
and Dt[·] denotes the Malliavin derivative (see Remark 2.2). Note that the
conditional expectation in (7) is well defined by the extension of the Malliavin
derivative introduced by Aase et al. [1], see Remark 2.2. Equations (6)-(7) form
an FBSDE-system involving Malliavin derivatives. To the best of our knowledge,
such systems have not been studied before.
Remark 2.2 We refer to Nualart [11], Sanz-Solè [22] and Di Nunno et al. [5]
for information about the Malliavin derivative Dt for Brownian motion B(t)
and, more generally, Lévy processes. In Aase et al. [1], Dt was extended from
the space D1,2 to L
2(P ), where D1,2 denotes the classical space of Malliavin
differentiable FT -measurable random variables. The extension is such that for
all F ∈ L2(FT , P ), the following holds:
(i) DtF ∈ (S)
∗, where (S)∗ ⊇ L2(P ) denotes the Hida space of stochastic
distributions,
(ii) the map (t, ω) → E[DtF |Ft] belongs to L
2(FT , λ × P ), where λ denotes
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the Lebesgue measure on [0, T ].
Moreover, the following generalized Clark-Ocone theorem holds:
(iii)
F = E[F ] +
∫ T
0
E[DtF |Ft]dB(t). (8)
See [1], Theorem 3.11, and also [5], Theorem 6.35.
Notice that by combining Itô’s isometry with the Clark-Ocone theorem, we
obtain
E
[ ∫ T
0
E[DtF |Ft]
2dt
]
= E
[(∫ T
0
E[DtF |Ft]dB(t)
)2]
= E[(F 2 − E[F ]2)]
(9)
(iv) As observed in Agram et al. [2], we can also apply the Clark-Ocone theorem
to show the following generalized duality formula:
Let F ∈ L2(FT , P ) and let ϕ(t) ∈ L
2(λ× P ) be adapted. Then
E
[
F
∫ T
0
ϕ(t)dB(t)
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
E[DtF |Ft]ϕ(t)dt
]
(10)
Remark 2.3 Note that equation (6) is linear in λi, and hence, if pi, qi, ri were
given, it could be solved by using the Itô formula. However, this solution will
depend on the processes X,Yi,Λi and Wi, so in order to find an explicit solution
for λi, we must also solve the coupled FBSDE system (1)-(2).
The BSDE 7 is linear in pi, and hence, if λi was given, it would be possible
to find a unique solution to this equation by using e.g. Proposition 6.2.1 in
Pham [19] or Theorem 1.7 in Øksendal and Sulem [17]. However, as for the
adjoint SDE (6), this solution will depend on the coupled FBSDE system (1)-(2).
In the remaining part of the paper, we will prove a sufficient (Section 3)
and a necessary maximum principle (Section 4) for this kind of FBSDE game
with delay and noisy memory. Then, we will study existence and uniqueness of
solutions of the FBSDE system (6)-(7) (Section 5). Finally, we will present an
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example which illustrates our results: optimal consumption rate with respect to
recursive utility (see Section 6).
3 Sufficient maximum principle for FBSDE games
with delay and noisy memory
We prove a sufficient maximum principle which roughly states that under con-
cavity conditions, a control (uˆ1, uˆ2) satisfying a conditional maximum principle
and an L2-condition is a Nash equilibrium for the stochastic game.
Theorem 3.1 Let uˆ1 ∈ A1 and uˆ2 ∈ A2 with corresponding solutions Xˆ(t), Yˆi(t), Λˆi(t),
Wˆi(t), Zˆi(t), Kˆi(t), λˆi(t), pˆi(t), qˆi(t), rˆi(t, ζ) of the FSDE (1), the BSDE (2), and
the FBSDE system (6)-(7) for i = 1, 2. Also, assume that:
• (Concavity I) The functions x→ hi(x), x→ ϕi(x), x→ ψi(x) are concave
for i = 1, 2.
• (The conditional maximum principle)
ess sup v∈A1E[H1(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), Λˆ(t), Wˆ1(t), Zˆ1(t), Kˆ1(t, ·),
v, uˆ2(t), λˆ1(t), pˆ1(t), qˆ1(t), rˆ1(t, ·))|E
(1)
t ]
= E[H1(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), Λˆ(t), Wˆ1(t), Zˆ1(t), Kˆ1(t, ·),
uˆ1(t), uˆ2(t), λˆ1(t), pˆ1(t), qˆ1(t), rˆ1(t, ·))|E
(1)
t ]
and similarly
ess sup v∈A2E[H2(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), Λˆ(t), Wˆ2(t), Zˆ2(t), Kˆ2(t, ·),
uˆ1, v, λˆ2(t), pˆ2(t), qˆ2(t), rˆ2(t, ·))|E
(2)
t ]
= E[H2(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), Λˆ(t), Wˆ2(t), Zˆ2(t), Kˆ2(t, ·),
uˆ1(t), uˆ2(t), λˆ2(t), pˆ2(t), qˆ2(t), rˆ2(t, ·))|E
(2)
t ].
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• (Concavity II) The functions
Hˆ1(t, x, y1,Λ1, w1, z1, k1)
:= ess sup v∈A1E[H1(t, x, y1, yˆ2,Λ1, Λˆ2, w1, z1, k1, v, uˆ2, λˆ1, pˆ1, qˆ1, rˆ1)|E
(1)
t ]
and
Hˆ2(t, x, y2,Λ2, w2, z2, k2)
:= ess sup v∈A2E[H2(t, x, yˆ1, y2, Λˆ1,Λ2, w2, z2, k2, uˆ1, v, λˆ2, pˆ2, qˆ2, rˆ2)|E
(2)
t ]
are concave for all t a.s.
• Finally, assume that the following L2 conditions hold:
E[
∫ T
0
{
pˆ2i (t)
[(
σ(t)− σˆ(t)
)2
+
∫
R
(
ri(t, ζ)− rˆi(t, ζ)
)2
ν(dζ)
]
+
(
X(t)− Xˆ(t)
)2
[qˆ2i (t) +
∫
R
rˆ2i (t, ζ)ν(dζ)]
+
(
Yi(t)− Yˆi(t)
)2
[(∂Hˆi
∂z
)2(t) +
∫
R
||∇kHˆi(t, ζ)||
2ν(dζ)]
+λˆ2i (t)[
(
Λi(t)− Λˆi(t)
)2
+
∫
R
(Ki(t, ζ) − Kˆi(t, ζ))
2ν(dζ)]
}
] <∞
for i = 1, 2.
Then, (uˆ1, uˆ2) is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We would like to show that J1(u1, uˆ2) ≤ J1(uˆ1, uˆ2) for all u1 ∈ A1.
Choose u1 ∈ A1. By the definition of the performance function J1,
δ := J1(u1, uˆ2)− J1(uˆ1, uˆ2) = I1 + I2 + I3
where
I1 = E[
∫ T
0
{f1(t, x, y,Λ,u)− f1(t, xˆ, yˆ, Λˆ, uˆ)}dt],
I2 = E[ϕ1(X(T ))− ϕ1(Xˆ(T ))],
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I3 = E[ψ1(W1(0))− ψ1(Wˆ1(0))].
Note that from the definition of the Hamiltonian,
I1 = E[
∫ T
0 {H1(t)− Hˆ1(t)− λˆ1(t)(g1(t)− gˆ1(t))− pˆ1(t)(b(t) − bˆ(t))
−qˆ1(t)(σ(t) − σˆ(t)) −
∫
R
rˆ1(t, ζ)(γ(t, ζ) − γˆ(t, ζ)ν(dζ))}dt]
(11)
where we have used the abbreviation
Hˆ1(t) := H1(t, Xˆ(t), Yˆ (t), Λˆ(t), Wˆ1(t), Zˆ1(t), Kˆ1(t, ·), uˆ, λˆ1, pˆ1, qˆ1, rˆ1, ω)
and corresponding abbreviations for H1(t), b(t), bˆ(t), σ, σˆ(t), γ(t) and γˆ(t).
Also,
I2 = E[ϕ1(X(T ))− ϕ1(Xˆ(T ))]
≤ E[ϕ′1(Xˆ(T ))(X(T )− Xˆ(T ))]
= E[(pˆ1(T )− h
′
1(Xˆ(T ))λˆ1(T ))(X(T )− Xˆ(T ))]
= E[pˆ1(T )(X(T )− Xˆ(T ))]− E[λˆ1(T )h
′
1(Xˆ(T ))(X(T )− Xˆ(T ))]
= E[
∫ T
0
pˆ1(t)(dX(t) − dXˆ(t)) +
∫ T
0
(X(t)− Xˆ(t))dpˆ1(t)
+
∫ T
0
qˆ1(t)(σ(t) − σˆ(t))dt +
∫ T
0
∫
R
rˆ1(t, ζ)(γ(t, ζ) − γˆ(t, ζ))ν(dζ)dt]
−E[λˆ1(T )h
′
1(Xˆ(T ))(X(T )− Xˆ(T ))]
= E[
∫ T
0
pˆ1(t)(b(t) − bˆ(t))dt +
∫ T
0
(X(t)− Xˆ(t))(−∂Hˆ1
∂x
(t)
−∂Hˆ1
∂y1
(t+ δ1)1[0,T−δ1](t) +
∫ t+δ1
t
Dt[−
∂Hˆ1
∂Λ1
(s)]1[0,T ](s)ds)dt
+
∫ T
0
qˆ1(t)(σ(t) − σˆ(t))dt +
∫ T
0
∫
R
rˆ1(t, ζ)(γ(t, ζ) − γˆ(t, ζ))ν(dζ)dt]]
−E[λˆ1(T )h
′
1(Xˆ(T ))(X(T )− Xˆ(T ))]
(12)
where the first inequality follows from the concavity of ϕ1, the second equality
follows from equation (7), the fourth equality from Itô’s product rule applied to
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pˆ1X and pˆ1Xˆ , the fifth equality follows from equation (7), the double expecta-
tion rule and equation (1).
Also, note that
I3 = E[ψ1(W1(0))− ψ1(Wˆ1(0))]
≤ E[ψ′1(Wˆ1(0))(W1(0)− Wˆ1(0))]
= E[λˆ1(T )(W1(T )− Wˆ1(T ))]− {E[
∫ T
0
(W1(t)− Wˆ1(t))dλˆ1(t)
+
∫ T
0
λˆ1(t)(dW1(t)− dWˆ1(t)) +
∫ T
0
∂Hˆ1
∂z1
(t)(Z1(t)− Zˆ1(t))dt
+
∫ T
0
∫
R
∇k1Hˆ1(t)(K1(t)− Kˆ1(t))ν(dζ)dt]}
= E[λˆ1(T )(h1(X(T ))− h1(Xˆ(T )))]− {E[
∫ T
0
∂Hˆ1
∂w1
(t)(W1(t)− Wˆ1(t))dt
+
∫ T
0
λˆ1(t)(−g1(t) + gˆ1(t))dt+
∫ T
0
∂Hˆ1
∂z1
(t)(Z1(t)− Zˆ1(t))dt
+
∫ T
0
∫
R
∇kHˆ1(t)(K1(t)− Kˆ1(t))ν(dζ)dt]}
≤ E[λˆ1(T )h
′
1(Xˆ(T ))(X(T )− Xˆ(T ))]− {E[
∫ T
0
∂Hˆ1
∂w1
(t)(W1(t)− Wˆ1(t))dt
+
∫ T
0
λˆ1(t)(−g1(t) + gˆ1(t))dt+
∫ T
0
∂Hˆ1
∂z1
(t)(Z1(t)− Zˆ1(t))dt
+
∫ T
0
∫
R
∇k1Hˆ1(t)(K1(t)− Kˆ1(t))ν(dζ)dt]}
(13)
where the first inequality follows from the concavity of ψ1, the second equality
follows from equation (6), the third equality follows from Itô’s product rule
applied to λˆ1Y1 and λˆ1Yˆ1, the fourth equality follows from equation (2) as well
as equation (6). The final inequality follows from the concavity of h1 and that
λˆ1(T ) ≥ 0.
Hence,
12
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∆ = I1 + I2 + I3
≤ E[
∫ T
0
{H1(t)− Hˆ1(t)−
(
∂Hˆ1
∂x
(t) + ∂Hˆ1
∂y1
(t+ δ1)1[0,T−δ1](t)
+
∫ t+δ1
t
Dt[
∂Hˆ1
∂Λ1
(s)]1[0,T ](s)ds
)
(X(t)− Xˆ(t))dt}
−
∫ T
0
{
∂Hˆ1
∂w1
(t)(W1(t)− Wˆ1(t)) +
∂Hˆ1
∂z1
(t)(Z1(t)− Zˆ1(t))
+
∫
R
∇k1Hˆ1(t)(K1(t, ζ)− Kˆ1(t, ζ))ν(dζ)
}
dt].
(14)
Note that by changing the order of integration and using the duality formula
for Malliavin derivatives (see Di Nunno et al. [5]), we get:
E
[ ∫ T
0
∂Hˆ1
∂Λ1
(s)
(
Λ1(s)− Λˆ1(s)
)
ds
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
∂Hˆ1
∂Λ1
(s)
∫ s
s−δ1
(
X(t)− Xˆ(t)
)
dB(t)ds
]
=
∫ T
0
E
[
∂Hˆ1
∂Λ1
(s)
∫ s
s−δ1
(
X(t)− Xˆ(t)
)
dB(t)
]
ds
=
∫ T
0
E[
∫ s
s−δ1
E[Dt(
∂Hˆ1
∂Λ1
(s))|Ft]
(
X(t)− Xˆ(t)
)
dt]ds
= E[
∫ T
0
∫ t+δ1
t
E[Dt(
∂Hˆ1
∂Λ1
(s))|Ft]1[0,T ](s)ds(X(t)− Xˆ(t))dt
]
= E[
∫ T
0
∫ t+δ1
t
Dt(
∂Hˆ1
∂Λ1
(s))1[0,T ](s)ds(X(t)− Xˆ(t))dt
]
.
(15)
Also, note that
E
[ ∫ T
0
∂Hˆ
∂y1
(t)
(
Y1(t)− Yˆ1(t)
)
dt
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
∂Hˆ
∂y1
(t)
(
X(t− δ)− Xˆ(t− δ1)
)
dt
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
∂Hˆ
∂y1
(t+ δ1)1[0,T−δ1](t)
(
X(t)− Xˆ(t)
)
dt
]
.
(16)
Hence, by the inequality (14) combined with equations (15) and (16),
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∆ ≤ E[
∫ T
0
{H1(t)− Hˆ1(t)−
∂Hˆ1
∂x
(t)(X(t)− Xˆ(t)) − ∂Hˆ1
∂y1
(t)(Y1(t)− Yˆ1(t))
−∂Hˆ1
∂Λ1
(t)(Λ1(t)− Λˆ1(t))dt−
∂Hˆ1
∂w1
(t)(W1(t)− Wˆ1(t))−
∂Hˆ1
∂z1
(t)(Z1(t)− Zˆ1(t))
+
∫
R
∇k1Hˆ1(t)(K1(t, ζ) − Kˆ1(t, ζ))ν(dζ)}dt].
(17)
By assumption, Hˆ1 is concave, so it is superdifferentiable
∗ (see Rockafel-
lar [21]) at the point ~x := (Xˆ, Yˆ1, Λˆ1, Wˆ1, Zˆ1, Kˆ1). Thus, there exists a super-
gradient ~a := (a0, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5(·)) such that for all ~y := (x, y,Λ, w, z, k), the
following holds:
Hˆ1(~x) + ~a · (~y − ~x) ≥ Hˆ1(~y). (18)
Define
φ1(x, y,Λ, w, z, k) := Hˆ1(x, y,Λ, w, z, k)− Hˆ1(Xˆ, Yˆ1, Λˆ1, Wˆ1, Zˆ1, Kˆ1)
−{a0(x − Xˆ) + a1(y − Yˆ1) + a2(Λ− Λ1) + a3(w − Wˆ1) + a4(z − Zˆ1)
+
∫
R
a5(ζ)(k − Kˆ1)ν(dζ))}.
(19)
Then, by equation (18)
φ1(x, y,Λ, w, z, k) ≤ 0 for all x, y,Λ, w, z, k,
φ1(Xˆ, Yˆ1, Λˆ1, Wˆ1, Zˆ1, Kˆ1) = 0 (by definition).
(20)
Therefore, by differentiating equation (19) and using equation (20), we find
that
∗Defined similarly as subdifferentiability for convex functions.
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a0 =
∂Hˆ1
∂x
(Xˆ, Yˆ1, Λˆ1, Wˆ1, Zˆ1, Kˆ1) =
∂Hˆ1
∂x
a1 =
∂Hˆ1
∂y1
(Xˆ, Yˆ1, Λˆ1, Wˆ1, Zˆ1, Kˆ1) =
∂Hˆ1
∂y1
a2 =
∂Hˆ1
∂Λ1
(Xˆ, Yˆ1, Λˆ1, Wˆ1, Zˆ1, Kˆ1) =
∂Hˆ1
∂Λ1
a3 =
∂Hˆ1
∂w1
(Xˆ, Yˆ1, Λˆ1, Wˆ1, Zˆ1, Kˆ1) =
∂Hˆ1
∂w1
a4 =
∂Hˆ1
∂z1
(Xˆ, Yˆ1, Λˆ1, Wˆ1, Zˆ1, Kˆ1) =
∂Hˆ1
∂z1
a5 = ∇k1Hˆ1(Xˆ, Yˆ1, Λˆ1, Wˆ1, Zˆ1, Kˆ1) = ∇k1Hˆ1.
Therefore, it follows from this, equation (17) and equation (20) that
∆ = φ(X(t), Y1(t),Λ1(t),W1(t), Z1(t),K1(t, ·)) ≤ 0
where the final inequality follows since Hˆ1 is concave.
This means that J1(u1, uˆ2) ≤ J1(uˆ1, uˆ2) for all u1 ∈ A1.
In a similar way, one can prove that J2(uˆ1, u2) ≤ J2(uˆ1, uˆ2) for all u2 ∈ A2.
This completes the proof that (uˆ1, uˆ2) is a Nash-equilibrium.

4 Necessary maximum principle for FBSDE games
with delay and noisy memory
In the following, we need some additional assumptions and notation:
• For all t0 ∈ [0, T ] and all bounded Ei(t)-measurable random variables
αi(ω), the control
βi(t) := 1(t0,T )(t)αi(ω) is in Ai for i = 1, 2. (21)
• For all ui, βi ∈ Ai with βi bounded, there exists κi > 0 such that the
control
15
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ui(t) + sβi(t) for t ∈ [0, T ] (22)
belongs to Ai for all s ∈ (−κi, κi), i = 1, 2.
• Also, assume that the following derivative processes exist and belong to
L2([0, T ]× Ω):
x1(t) =
d
ds
X(u1+sβ1,u2)(t)|s=0,
y1(t) =
d
ds
Y
(u1+sβ1,u2)
1 (t)|s=0,
Λ˜1(t) =
d
ds
Λ
(u1+sβ1,u2)
1 (t)|s=0,
w1(t) =
d
ds
W
(u1+sβ1,u2)
1 (t)|s=0,
z1(t) =
d
ds
Z
(u1+sβ1,u2)
1 (t)|s=0,
k1(t) =
d
ds
K
(u1+sβ1,u2)
1 (t)|s=0,
(23)
and similarly for x2(t) =
d
ds
X(u1,u2+sβ2)(t)|s=0 etc. Notice that xi(0) = 0
for i = 1, 2 since X(0) = x.
If these assumptions hold, we can prove a necessary maximum principle for
our noisy memory FBSDE game. The proof of the following theorem is based on
the same idea as the proof of Theorem 2.2 in Øksendal and Sulem [14], however
the presence of noisy memory in our problem requires some extra care.
Theorem 4.1 Suppose that u ∈ A with corresponding solutions X(t), Yi(t),
Λi(t),Wi(t), Zi(t),Ki(t, ζ), λi(t), pi(t), qi(t), ri(t, ζ), i = 1, 2, of equations (1),
(2), (6) and (7). Also, assume that conditions (21)-(23) hold. Then, the fol-
lowing are equivalent:
(i) ∂
∂s
J1(u1 + sβ1, u2)|s=0 =
∂
∂s
J2(u1, u2 + sβ2)|s=0 = 0 for all bounded β1 ∈
A1, β2 ∈ A2.
(ii) E[∂H1(t,X(t),Y (t),Λ(t),W1(t),Z1(t),K1(t,·),v1,u2(t),λ1(t),p1(t),q1(t),r1(t,·))
∂v1
]|v1=u1(t)
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= E[∂H2(t,X(t),Y (t),Λ(t),W2(t),Z2(t),K2(t,·),u1(t),v2,λ2(t),p2(t),q2(t),r2(t,·))
∂v2
]|v2=u2(t)
= 0.
Proof. We only prove that ∂
∂s
J1(u1+sβ1, u2)|s=0 = 0 for all bounded β1 ∈ A1
is equivalent to
E[∂H1(t,X(t),Y (t),Λ(t),W1(t),Z1(t),K1(t,·),v1,u2(t),λ1(t),p1(t),q1(t),r1(t,·))
∂v1
]|v1=u1(t) = 0.
The remaining part of the theorem (i.e., the same statement for J2 and H2)
is proved in a similar way.
Note that, by the definition of J1 and by interchanging differentiation and
integration,
D1 :=
∂
∂s
J1(u1 + sβ1, u2)|s=0
= E[
∫ T
0 {
∂f1
∂x
(t)x1(t) +
∂f1
∂y
(t)y1(t) +
∂f1
∂Λ (t)Λ˜1(t)
∂f1
∂u1
(t)β1(t)}dt
+ϕ′1(X(T ))x1(T ) + φ
′
1(W1(0))w1(0)].
We study the different parts of D1 separately. First, by the Itô product rule,
the adjoint BSDE (7) and the definition of x1(t),
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I1 := E[ϕ
′
1(X(T ))x1(T )]
= E[p1(T )x1(T )]− E[h
′
1(X(T ))λ1(T )x1(T )]
= E[p1(0)x1(0)] + E[
∫ T
0
p1(t)dx1(t) +
∫ T
0
x1(t)dp1(t)
+
∫ T
0
d[p1, x1](t)]− E[h
′
1(X(T ))λ1(T )x1(T )]
= E[
∫ T
0
p1(t)
(
∂b
∂x
(t)x1(t) +
∂b
∂y1
(t)y1(t) +
∂b
∂Λ1
(t)Λ˜1(t) +
∂b
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
)
dt]
+E[
∫ T
0
x1(t)E[µ1(t)|Ft]dt]
+E[
∫ T
0
q1(t)
(
∂σ
∂x
(t)x1(t) +
∂σ
∂y1
(t)y1(t) +
∂σ
∂Λ1
Λ˜1(t) +
∂σ
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
)
dt]
+E[
∫ T
0
∫
R
r1(t, ζ)
(
∂γ
∂x
(t)x1(t) +
∂γ
∂y1
(t)y1(t) +
∂γ
∂Λ1
Λ˜1(t) +
∂γ
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
)
dν(ζ)dt]
−E[h′1(X(T ))λ1(T )x1(T )].
(24)
Also, by the FSDE (6), the BSDE (2), the definition of x1(t) and the Itô
product rule,
I2 := E[φ
′
1(W1(0))w1(0)]
= E[λ1(0)w1(0)]
= E[λ1(T )w1(T )]− E[
∫ T
0 λ1(t)dw1(t) +
∫ T
0 w1(t)dλ1(t)
+
∫ T
0 z1(t)
∂H1
∂z1
(t)dt +
∫ T
0
∫
R
∇k1H1(t, ζ)k1(t, ζ)ν(dζ)dt]
= E[λ1(T )h
′
1(X(T ))x1(T )] + E[
∫ T
0 λ1(t)
(
∂g1
∂x
(t)x1(t) +
∂g1
∂y1
(t)y1(t)
+ ∂g1
∂Λ1
(t)Λ˜(t) + ∂g1
∂w1
(t)w1(t) +
∂g1
∂z1
(t)z1(t) +∇k1g1(t)k1(t)
+ ∂g1
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
)
dt]− E[
∫ T
0
∂H1
∂w1
(t)w1(t)dt]
−E[
∫ T
0 z1(t)
∂H1
∂z1
(t)dt+
∫ T
0
∫
R
∇kH1(t, ζ)k1(t, ζ)ν(dζ)dt].
(25)
By the definition of D1 as well as equations (24) and (25),
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D1 = A+ E[
∫ T
0
β1(t)
(
∂f1
∂u1
(t) + ∂b
∂u1
(t)p1(t) +
∂σ
∂u1
(t)q1(t) +
∂γ
∂u1
(t)r1(t)
+ ∂g1
∂u1
(t)λ1(t)
)
dt] + E[
∫ T
0
w1(t){−
∂H1
∂w1
(t) + ∂g1
∂w1
(t)λ1(t)}dt
+
∫ T
0
z1(t){−
∂H1
∂z1
(t) + ∂g1
∂x
(t)λ1(t)}dt
+
∫ T
0
k1(t){−∇k1H1(t) +∇kg1(t)λ1(t)}dt]
(26)
where
A := E[
∫ T
0 x1(t){
∂f1
∂x
(t) + ∂b
∂x
(t)p1(t) + E[µ1(t)|Ft] +
∂σ
∂x
(t)q1(t)
+∂γ
∂x
(t)r1(t) +
∂g1
∂x
(t)λ1(t)}dt+
∫ T
0 y1(t){
∂f1
∂y1
(t) + ∂b
∂y1
(t)p1(t)
+ ∂σ
∂y1
(t)q1(t) +
∂γ
∂y1
(t)r1(t) +
∂g1
∂y1
(t)λ1(t)}dt+
∫ T
0 Λ˜1(t){
∂f1
∂Λ1
(t)
+ ∂b
∂Λ1
(t)p1(t) +
∂σ
∂Λ1
(t)q1(t) +
∂γ
∂Λ1
(t)r1(t) +
∂g1
∂Λ1
(t)λ1(t)}dt]
= E[
∫ T
0 x1(t){
∂H1
∂x
(t) + E[µ1(t)|Ft]}dt] + E[
∫ T
0 y1(t)
∂H1
∂y1
(t)]
+E[
∫ T
0 Λ˜1(t)
∂H1
∂Λ1
(t)].
(27)
Then, by using the definition of the Hamiltonian H1, see equation (5), we
see that everything inside the curly brackets in equation (26) is equal to zero.
Hence,
D1 = A+ E[
∫ T
0
β1(t)
∂H1
∂u1
(t)dt].
Recall that from the definitions of y1 and Λ˜1,
y1(t) = x1(t− δ1) and Λ˜1(t) =
∫ t
t−δ1
x1(u)dB(u).
This implies, by change of variables
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E[
∫ T
0
y1(t)
∂H1
∂y1
(t)] = E[
∫ T
0
x1(t− δ1)
∂H1
∂y1
(t)dt]
=
∫ T−δ1
−δ1
x1(u)
∂H1
∂y1
(u+ δ1)du]
= E[
∫ T
0
x1(u)1[0,T−δ1](u)
∂H1
∂y1
(u + δ1)du].
Also, by the duality formula for Malliavin derivatives (see Di Nunno et al. [5])
and changing the order of integration
E[
∫ T
0
Λ˜1(t)
∂H1
∂Λ1
(t)] = E[
∫ T
0
∫ t
t−δ1
x1(u)dB(u)
∂H1
∂Λ1
(t)dt]
= E[
∫ T
0
∫ t
t−δ1
E[Du(
∂H1
∂Λ1
(t))|Fu]x1(u)du dt]
= E[
∫ T
0
∫ u+δ1
u
E[Du(
∂H1
∂Λ1
(t))|Fu]1[0,T ](t)dt x1(u) du].
But, from the definition of µ1,
E[
∫ T
0 x1(t)E[µ1(t)|Ft]dt] = E[
∫ T
0 E[x1(t)µ1(t)|Ft] dt]
= E[
∫ T
0 E[x1(t){−
∂H1
∂x
(t)− ∂H1
∂y1
(t+ δ1)1[0,T−δ1]
−
∫ t+δ1
t
Dt[
∂H1
∂Λ1
(s)]1[0,T ](s)ds}|Ft]dt].
So, by the rule of double expectation and the calculations above, A = 0.
This implies that D1 = E[
∫ T
0 β1(t)
∂H1
∂u1
(t)dt], so
∂
∂s
J1(u1 + sβ1, u2)|s=0 = E[
∫ T
0
β1(t)
∂H1
∂u1
(t)dt]
which was what we wanted to prove.

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5 Solution of the noisy memory FBSDE
In this section, we consider a slightly simplified version of the system of noisy
memory FBSDEs in equations (6) and (7). Instead, consider the following noisy
memory FBSDE :
FSDE in λ,
dλ(t) = ∂H
∂w
(t)dt+ ∂H
∂z
(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
∇kH(t, ζ)N˜ (dt, dζ)
λ(0) = φ′(W (0)).
(28)
BSDE in p, q and r,
dp(t) = −E[µ(t)|Ft]dt+ q(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
r(t, ζ)N˜ (dt, dζ)
p(T ) = ϕ′(X(T )) + h′(X(T ))λ(T )
(29)
where
H(t, x, y1, y2,Λ1,Λ2, w, z, k, u1, u2, λ, p, q, r)
= f(t, x, y,Λ, u1, u2) + λg(t, x, y1, y2,Λ1,Λ2, w, z, k, u1, u2)
+pb(t, x, y1, y2,Λ1,Λ2, u1, u2) + qσ(t, x, y1, y2,Λ1,Λ2, u1, u2)
+
∫
R
r(ζ)γ(t, x, y1, y2,Λ1,Λ2, u1, u2, ζ)ν(dζ)
and
µ(t) =
∂H
∂x
(t) +
∂H
∂y
(t+ δ)1[0,T−δ](t) +
∫ t+δ
t
E[Dt[
∂H
∂Λ
(s)]|Ft]1[0,T ](s)ds.
Note that the set of equations (6) and (7) are two such systems such as
(28)-(29) involving the same X process as well as the same controls u1, u2.
Also, consider the following system consisting of an FSDE and two BSDEs:
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FSDE in λ,
dλ˜(t) = ∂H
∂w
(t)dt + ∂H
∂z
(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
∇kH(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ)
λ˜(0) = φ′(W (0)).
(30)
BSDE in p1, q1 and r1,
dp1(t) = −E[µ1(t)|Ft]dt+ q1(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
r1(t, ζ)N˜ (dt, dζ)
p1(T ) = ϕ
′(X(T )) + h′(X(T ))λ˜(T ).
(31)
BSDE in p2, q2 and r2,
dp2(t) = −E[µ2(t)|Ft]dt+ q2(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
r2(t, ζ)N˜ (dt, dζ)
p2(T ) = 0
(32)
where
H(t, x, y1, y2,Λ1,Λ2, w, z, k, u1, u2, λ˜, p1, p2, q1, q2, r1, r2)
= q2(t)x +H(t, x, y1, y2,Λ1,Λ2, w, z, k, u1, u2, λ˜, p1, q1, r1),
(33)
µ1(t) = q2(t) +
∂H
∂x
(t) +
∂H
∂y
(t+ δ)1[0,T−δ](t)
and
µ2(t) =
∂H
∂Λ
(t)−
∂H
∂Λ
(t+ δ)1[0,T−δ](t).
Note that ∂H
∂Λ (t) =
∂H
∂Λ (t),
∂H
∂Λ (t) = q2(t) +
∂H
∂Λ (t) and
∂H
∂y
(t) = ∂H
∂y
(t). Hence,
equations (28) and (30) are structurally equal.
Then, by similar techniques as in Dahl et al. [6], we can show the following
theorem:
Theorem 5.1 Assume that (pi, qi, ri) for i = 1, 2 and λ˜ solve the FBSDE sys-
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tem (30)-(32). Define λ = λ˜, p(t) = p1(t), q(t) = q1(t) and r(t, ·) = r1(t, ·) and
assume that E[
∫ T
0
(∂H(t)
∂z
)2]dt < ∞. Then, (p, q, r, λ) solves the noisy memory
FBSDE (28)-(29) and
q2(t) =
∫ t+δ
t
E[Dt[
∂H
∂Λ
(s)]|Ft]ds.
Proof. The jump terms do not make a difference here, so assume for sim-
plicity that r = r1 = r2 = 0 everywhere.
In general, we know that if dp2(t) = −θ(t, p2, q2)dt+ q2(t)dB(t), p2(T ) = F ,
then
q2(t) = Dtp2(t). (34)
Now, note that the solution p2 of the BSDE (32) can be written
p2(t) = −E[
∫ T
t
E[µ2(s)|Fs]ds|Ft]
= −
∫ T
t
E[µ2(s)|Ft]ds
= −
∫ T
t
E[∂H
∂Λ (t)−
∂H
∂Λ (t+ δ)1[0,T−δ](t)|Ft]ds
= −
∫ t+δ
t
E[∂H(s)
∂Λ |Ft]1[0,T ](s)ds
where the equalities follow from Fubini’s theorem, the rule of double ex-
pectation, the definition of µ2 and a change of variables. Hence, by equation
(34):
q2(t) = Dtp2(t)
= Dt[
∫ t+δ
t
E[∂H(s)
∂Λ |Ft]1[0,T ](s)]ds
=
∫ t+δ
t
E[Dt(
∂H(s)
∂Λ )|Ft]1[0,T ](s)ds
which is part of what we wanted to prove.
By inserting this expression for q2 into the definition of µ1, we see that
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µ1(t) =
∫ t+δ
t
E[Dt[
∂H(s)
∂Λ
]|Ft]1[0,T ](s)ds+
∂H(t)
∂x
+
∂H(t+ δ)
∂y
1[0,T ](t+ δ).
Hence, we see that the BSDE (31) is the same as (29), so they have the same
solution. This completes the proof of the theorem.

We can also prove the following converse result.
Theorem 5.2 If p, q, r, λ solve the FBSDE (28)-(29) and we define λ˜ = λ,
p1 = p, q1 = q, r1 = r and
p2(t) =
∫ t+δ
t
E[∂H
∂Λ (s)|Ft]1[0,T−δ](s)ds
q2(t) =
∫ t+δ
t
E[Dt[
∂H
∂Λ (s)]|Ft]1[0,T−δ](s)ds
r2(t, ·) = 0.
Then, (pi, qi, ri) for i = 1, 2 and λ˜ solve the system of equations (30)-(32).
Proof. Again, the jump parts make no crucial difference, so we consider the
no-jump situation for simplicity.
It is clear that equation (30) holds from the assumptions above (from the
definition of H, see (33)). Also, the BSDE (31) holds: Clearly, the terminal
condition holds, and by the computations in the proof of Theorem 5.1, the
remaining part of equation (31) also holds. Therefore, it only remains to prove
that the BSDE (32) holds.
By the Itô isometry and the Clark-Ocone formula,
E[
∫ T
0
E[Ds(
∂H(r)
∂Λ )|Fs]
2ds] = E[(
∫ T
0
E[Ds
∂H(r)
∂Λ |Fs]dBs)
2]
= E[(∂H
∂Λ (r))
2 − E[∂H
∂Λ (r)]
2].
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Hence,
∫ T
0
E[
∫ T
0
E[Ds(
∂H(r)
∂Λ )|Fs]
2ds]
1
2 dr =
∫ T
0
(E[∂H
∂Λ (r)
2]− E[∂H
∂Λ (r)]
2)
1
2 dt <∞.
Note that from the Clark-Ocone theorem,
∂H(r)
∂Λ
= E[
∂H(r)
∂Λ
|Ft] +
∫ r
t
E[Ds(
∂H(r)
∂Λ
)|Fs]dB(s).
Therefore, by the definition of q2 in the theorem and the Fubini theorem
∫ T
t
q2(s)dB(s) =
∫ T
t
∫ T
t
E[Ds(
∂H(r)
∂Λ )|Fs]1[s,s+δ](r)drdB(s)
=
∫ T
t
∫ T
t
E[Ds(
∂H(r)
∂Λ )|Fs]1[r−δ,r](s)dB(s)dr.
By some algebra and the Clark-Ocone theorem (8),
∫ T
t
∫ T
t
E[Ds(
∂H(r)
∂Λ )|Fs]1[r−δ,r](s)dB(s)dr =
∫ T
t
∫ r
r−δ
E[Ds(
∂H(r)
∂Λ )|Fs]dB(s)dr
=
∫ T
t
(∂H(r)
∂Λ − E[
∂H(r)
∂Λ |Fr−δ])dr
By splitting the integrals and using change of variables (twice) as well as some
algebra,
=
∫ T
t
∂H(s)
∂Λ ds−
∫ T−δ
t−δ
E[∂H(s+δ)
∂Λ |Fs]ds
=
∫ T
t
∂H(s)
∂Λ ds−
∫ T
t
E[∂H(s+δ)
∂Λ |Fs]1[0,T−δ](s)ds
−
∫ t+δ
t
E[∂H(s)
∂Λ |Ft]1[0,T−δ](s)ds
=
∫ T
t
E[∂H(s)
∂Λ −
∂H(s+δ)
∂Λ 1[0,T−δ](s)|Fs]ds− p2(t).
This proves that the BSDE (32) holds as well.

Now, we have expressed the solution of the Malliavin FBSDE via the solution
of the “double” FBSDE system (30)-(32). What kind of system of equations is
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this? The system consists of two connected BSDEs in (p1, q1, r1) and (p2, q2, r2)
respectively, and these are again connected to a FBSDE in λ. However, from
equation (32) and the definition of µ2, we see that the right hand side of (32)
does not depend on p2. Hence, the BSDE (32) can be rewritten
dp2(t) = h(t, λ, p1, q1, r1(·))dt + q2(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
r2(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ)
p2(T ) = 0.
This can be solved to express p2 using λ, p1, q1 and r1(·) by letting q2(t) =
r2(t, ·) = 0 for all t and
p2(t) = E[
∫ T
t
h(t, λ, p1, q1, r1(·))dt|Ft].
Now, we can substitute this solution for p2(t) into the FBSDE system (30)-
(31). The resulting set of equations is a regular system of time advanced FBS-
DEs with jumps. There are to the best of our knowledge, no general results on
existence and uniqueness of such systems of FBSDEs. However, if we simplify
by removing the jumps and there was no time-advanced part (i.e., no delay
process Yi in the original FSDE (1)), there are some results by Ma et al. [10].
6 Optimal consumption rate with respect to re-
cursive utility
In this section, we apply the previous results to the problem of determining an
optimal consumption rate with respect to recursive utility (see also Øksendal
and Sulem [16] and Dahl and Øksendal [4]). Let X(t) = Xc(t), where the
consumption rate c(t) is our control, and assume that
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dX(t) = X(t)[µ(t)dt+ σ(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
γ(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ)]
−[c1(t) + c2(t)]X(t)dt,
X(0) = x > 0
(35)
and Wi(t) is given by
dWi(t) = −[αi(t)Wi(t) + ηi(t) ln(Yi(t)) + κi(t) ln(Λi(t)) + ln(ci(t)X(t))]
+Zi(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
Ki(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ)
Wi(T ) = 0.
Let the performance functional be defined by Ji(c1, c2) := Wi(0), i.e., Ji
is the recursive utility for player i. Also, assume that both players have full
information, so (E
(i)
t )t = (Ft)t for i = 1, 2.
We would like to find a Nash equilibrium for this FBSDE game with delay.
To do so we will use the maximum principle Theorem 3.1. Note that fi = ϕi =
hi = 0 and that ψi(w) = w for i = 1, 2. The Hamiltonians are:
Hi(t, x, y1, y2,Λ1,Λ2, wi, zi, ki, c1, c2, λi, pi, qi, ri(ζ))
= λi(αi(t)wi + ηi(t) ln(yi) + ln(cix))
+pi(xµ(t) − (c1 + c2)x) + qiσ(t)x +
∫
R
xri(ζ)γ(t, ζ)ν(dζ) for i = 1, 2.
The adjoint BSDEs are
dpi(t) = E[µi(t)|Ft]dt+ qi(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
ri(t, ζ)N˜ (dt, dζ),
pi(T ) = 0
where
µi(t) = −
λi(t)
X(t) −
λi(t+δi)ηi(t+δi)
Yi(t+δi)
1[0,T−δi](t)− pi(t)(µ(t) − (c1(t) + c2(t)))
+qi(t)σ(t) +
∫
R
ri(t, ζ)γ(t, ζ)ν(dζ)
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for i = 1, 2. Note that by the definition of Yi, Yi(t+δi) = X({t+δi}−δi) = X(t).
The adjoint BSDEs are linear, and the solutions are given by (see Øksendal
and Sulem [17])
Γi(t)pi(t) = E[
∫ T
t
(λi(s)
X(s) +
λi(s+δi)ηi(s+δi)
Yi(s+δi)
1[0,T−δi](s))Γi(s)ds|Ft]
= E[
∫ T
t
(λi(s)
X(s) +
λi(s+δi)ηi(s+δi)
X(s) 1[0,T−δi](s))Γi(s)ds|Ft]
(36)
where
dΓi(t) = Γi(t)[(µ(t) − (c1(t) + c2(t)))dt+ σ(t)dB(t) +
∫
R
γ(t, ζ)N˜(dt, dζ)]
Γi(0) = 1 for i = 1, 2.
Note that by the SDE (35),
xΓi(t) = X(t). (37)
Hence, by combining equations (36) and (37), we see that
X(t)pi(t) = E[
∫ T
t
(λi(s) + λi(s+ δi)ηi(s+ δi)1[0,T−δi](s))ds|Ft]. (38)
The adjoint FSDEs are
dλi(t) = λi(t)αi(t)dt
λi(0) = 1, for i = 1, 2.
These are (non-stochastic) differential equation with solution λi(t) = exp(
∫ t
0
αi(s)ds)
for i = 1, 2.
We maximize Hi with respect to ci. For i = 1, 2, the first order condition is:
cˆi(t) =
λi(t)
pi(t)X(t)
.
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By substituting equation (38) into this, we find (by the sufficient maximum
principle, Theorem 3.1) that the consumption rates leading to a Nash equilib-
rium for the recursive utility problem are given by:
c∗i (t) =
λi(t)
E[
∫ T
t
(λi(s) + λi(s+ δi)ηi(s+ δi)1[0,T−δi](t))ds|Ft]
.
where λi(t) = exp(
∫ t
0 αi(s)ds) for i = 1, 2.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed a two-player stochastic game connected to a
set of FBSDEs involving delay and noisy memory of the market process. We
have derived sufficient and necessary maximum principles for a set of controls
for the two players to be a Nash equilibrium in this game. We have also studied
the associated FBSDE involving Malliavin derivatives, and connected this to a
system of FBSDEs not involving Malliavin derivatives. Finally, we were able to
derive a closed form Nash equilibrium solution to a game where the aim is to
find the optimal consumption with respect to recursive utility.
References
[1] Aase, K., Øksendal, B., Privault, N. and Ubøe, J. 2000. White noise gener-
alizations of the Clark-Haussmann-Ocone theorem with application to math-
ematical finance, Finance and Stochastics, 4 (4): 465-496.
[2] Agram, N. and Øksendal, B. 2015. Malliavin calculus and optimal control
of stochastic Volterra equations, Journal of Optimization Theory and Appli-
cations, 3 (167): 1070-1094.
[3] Agram, N. and Øksendal, B. 2014. Infinite horizon optimal control of
forward-backward stochastic differential equations with delay, Journal of
Computational and Applied Mathematics, 259 (B): 336-349.
29
FBSDE games with delay and noisy memory
[4] Dahl, K. and Øksendal, B. 2017. Singular recursive utility, Stochastics, so
far only published online.
[5] Di Nunno, G., Øksendal, B. and Proske, F. 2009. Malliavin Calculus for
Lévy Processes with Applications to Finance, Springer, Berlin Heidelberg.
[6] Dahl, K., Mohammed, S., Øksendal, B. and Røse, E. 2016. Optimal control
of systems with noisy memory and BSDEs with Malliavin derivatives, Journal
of Functional Analysis, 2 (271): 289-329.
[7] Ivanov, A. F., Kazmerchuk Y. I. and Swishchuk A. V., The-
ory, Stochastic Stability and Applications of Stochastic Delay Dif-
ferential Equations: a Survey of Recent Results, Research report,
http://www.math.yorku.ca/∼aswishch/sddesurvey.pdf.
[8] Krylov, N. V. 2009. Controlled Diffusion Processes, Springer, Berlin Heidel-
berg.
[9] Krylov, N. V. 1972. Control of a Solution of a Stochastic Integral Equation
Theory of Probability and its Applications, 1 (17): 114-130.
[10] Ma, J., Yin, H. and Zhang, J. 2012. On non-Markovian forward-backward
SDEs and backward stochastic PDEs. Stochastic Processes and their Appli-
cations, 12 (122): 3980-4004.
[11] Nualart, D. 2006. The Malliavin Calculus and Related Topics, Springer,
Berlin Heidelberg.
[12] Øksendal, B. 2013. Stochastic differential equations: an introduction with
applications, Springer, Berlin Heidelberg.
[13] Øksendal, B. and Sulem, A. 2007. Applied Stochastic Control of Jump Dif-
fusions, Springer, Berlin Heidelberg.
[14] Øksendal, B. and Sulem, A. 2014. Forward-backward stochastic differential
games and stochastic control under model uncertainty, Journal of Optimiza-
tion Theory and Applications, 22 (161): 22-55.
30
FBSDE games with delay and noisy memory
[15] Øksendal, B. and Sulem, A. 2000. A maximum principle for optimal con-
trol of stochastic systems with delay, with applications to finance, Eds. J.M.
Menaldi, E. Rofman and A. Sulem: Optimal Control and Partial Differential
Equations - Innovations and Applications, IOS Press, Amsterdam.
[16] Øksendal, B. and Sulem, A. 2016. Optimal control of predictive mean-
field equations and applications to finance, Eds. Benth F., Di Nunno G.:
Stochastics of Environmental and Financial Economics, Springer Proceedings
in Mathematics & Statistics, 138, Springer, Cham.
[17] Øksendal, B. and Sulem, A. 2014. Risk minimization in financial markets
modeled by Itô Lévy processes. Research report, Department of Mathematics,
University of Oslo.
[18] Øksendal, B., Sulem, A. and Zhang, T. 2011. Optimal control of stochastic
delay equations and time-advanced backward stochastic differential equations,
Advances in Applied Probability, 2 (43): 572-596.
[19] Pham, H. 2009. Continuous-time Stochastic Control and Optimization with
Financial Applications, Stochastic Modelling and Applied Probability, 61: 139-
169.
[20] Pardoux, E. and Peng, S. 1990. Adapted Solutions of Backward stochastic
differential equation Systems and Control Letters, 1(14): 55-61.
[21] Rockafellar, R. T. 1970. Convex Analysis, Princeton University Press,
Princeton.
[22] Sanz-Solè, M. 2005. Malliavin Calculus. EPFL Press, Lausanne.
[23] Wang, S. and Wu, Z. 2016. Stochastic maximum principle for optimal con-
trol problems of forward-backward delay systems involving impulse controls,
Journal of Systems Science and Complexity, 2 (30): 280-306.
31
